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Introduction 
Within the last few years the subject of hospital infection control has become the 
subject of much media attention (e.g., Guardian Newspaper, 2007; BBC Panorama, 
2008). A number of high profile hospital outbreaks within the United Kingdom (UK) 
involving bacterium such as Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) and Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and the number of mortalities resulting from these 
outbreaks, has made infection control into a central priority for the NHS and other 
health care systems worldwide (Allegranzi et al., 2007). Much of the debate so far has 
concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g., hand washing). Very little 
research has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and organisational factors 
that may also determine infection control outbreaks (Griffiths, Renz and Rafferty, 
2008). The intention of the present study is to outline the potential of adopting a 
systems ergonomic perspective towards hospital-based infections. 
 
The systems approach and syst ms ergonomics  
Systems ergonomics, examines large-scale issues such as the analysis and improvement 
of work environments that involve social and technical (“sociotechnical”) elements 
including organisational structures, policies and procedures. Likewise, the systems 
approach involves a detailed examination of how these factors interact with one another 
and how they are distributed across a range of system levels and interfaces (e.g., 
management, staff and individual levels).  A number of different types of accidents, 
disasters and large-scale system failures have been analysed in the past, spanning a 
range of domains including transportation (e.g., the Paddington rail accident – Santos-
Reyes and Beard, 2006; Wilson et al., 2007), nuclear power (e.g., the Chernobyl 
disaster – Reason, 1987, 2008) and patient safety (Vincent, 2006).  
 
Hospitals represent good examples of complex large-scale sociotechnical systems since 
they involve a large diversity of professions spanning a range of roles and specialisms 
as well as technologies and artefacts ranging from the latest eHealth applications (e.g., 
electronic patient record systems) to more established physical design components (e.g., 
wards and buildings). Within systems ergonomics, a number of modelling frameworks 
exist (e.g., Vicente, 2006; Rasmussen, 1997) for understanding the dynamic interaction 
between levels within large-scale sociotechnical systems (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
 
Vicente and Christoffersen (2006) have used the framework to identify the lessons 
learnt from the May 2000 outbreak of Escherichia coli  (E. coli) which occurred in 
Walkerton, Canada. Their analysis used a graphical representation of the contributing 
factors that led up to the Walkerton outbreak. These ranged from decisions made at 
governmental levels (e.g., privatisation initiatives), the action of actors within the 
system (e.g., failures to take water samples), as well as equipment failures (e.g., shallow 
water wells). In order to demonstrate  the value of applying the systems approach and 
these types of modelling frameworks to infection control, the paper focuses on a 
specific case study, namely the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks 
in the UK which occurred between 2005-2007 (Healthcare Commission (HC), 2007).  
 
The Clostridium difficile outbreaks in the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS 
Trust 
 
Background to the outbreaks and timeline 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an estimated 90 people died 
at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as a result of becoming infected with 
the Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) bacteria (HC, 2007, p.5). Table 1 a timescale 
summarises the main events as they occurred at the Trust. 
 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
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Contributory factors leading up to the outbreaks 
The Healthcare Commission report identified a number of factors that contributed to the 
outbreaks that occurred with the Trust. These can be summarised in terms of five main 
themes: the role played by external organisations; management of the trust; clinical 
management on the hospital  wards; the role played by the infection control team; and,  
equipment and hygiene factors. 
 
The role of external organisations 
Within the report both the setting of government-led targets and financial pressures on 
NHS Trusts are mentioned as background, contributory factors that had an impact on 
the day-to-day operation of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust. In particular, the 
report mentions the need for Trust board members and managers to meet targets for the 
use of beds. Higher bed occupancy meant that there was less time for the cleaning and a 
higher probability of transmission of infection between patients (HC, 2007, pp.69-70).  
The need to meet financial targets also placed pressure on the Trust to decrease 
spending in areas that impacted upon infection control such as financing for new 
buildings and isolation areas. 
 
Infection control within the UK NHS is overseen by a number of bodies including the 
Health Protection Agency (HPA). The remit of the HPA is to provide advice and 
support to NHS, local authorities and other agencies with regard to public health issues.  
The creation of the HPA in April 2005 coincided with the first outbreak at the Trust. 
One part of the HPA, the health protection unit (HPU), was set up in order to support 
organisations in their management of infections. The report highlights that this caused 
some confusion within the Trust at the time of the outbreaks, as the expectation was that 
the HPU could give provide guidance covering the supervision and monitoring of 
infection control. The HPU did not have close involvement with the Trust and generally 
worked in a reactive way, responding to concerns as they arose (HC, 2007, p. 8).  
Similar problems were encountered within the much larger Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA) who are responsible for implementing government policy and fiscal control 
within regions of the UK. 
 
Management of the Trust 
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The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the 
management of the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In terms of clinical risks and 
incidents, management strategy in general “had been fragmentary and poorly 
understood” (HC, 2007, p. 77). The reports from an internal group set up within the 
Trust in order to analyse complaints, claims and incidents highlight, amongst others, the 
following issues: the unsatisfactory nature of some “escalation” areas (areas temporarily 
set up to deal with infected patients); the impact that the accident and emergency 
(A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality handover and transfer to wards 
from A&E; concerns about staffing levels, and, bank staff managing wards on some 
shifts. The style of leadership within the Trust and the overall management culture were 
also criticised in the report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive 
as being “autocratic” or “dictatorial” (HC, 2007 p. 91). The report concluded that the 
person appointed as director of infection prevention and control had “no real 
understanding of the role at the outset” (HC, 2007, p. 5). Turnover of managers and 
directors was also high. 
 
Finally, the trust’s management of staffing was criticised heavily within the report in 
several places. In 2006/07 the number of nurse per bed was 1.52, the same number as in 
2003/04 (HC, 2007, p. 82). Trust managers had not carried out a comprehensive review 
of staffing levels or a determination of minimum staffing levels. 
 
Clinical management on the hospital wards 
A review of the case notes of 50 patients who had died having had C. diff. found that in 
80% of the cases, at least one element of the clinical management, or monitoring of C. 
diff at ward level was unsatisfactory (HC, 2007, p. 4). A number of elements were 
mentioned, including: infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic 
monitoring as to whether or not a patient was recovering from C. diff.; and, failure to 
change antibiotic treatment when a patient failed to respond to the initial treatment (HC, 
2007, p. 4). Delays in starting treatment occurred on the wards, mostly because there 
was a delay in sending samples for analysis (HC, 1007, p. 33). There was also little 
evidence that once C. diff. had been diagnosed, that patients were monitored for severe 
signs of the infection (HC, 2007, p. 34). In other cases, it was clear that diagnoses were 
either not considered or had been missed. In 34% of the cases reviewed, medical 
records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diff had taken place (HC, 2007, p. 
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38). The management of fluids and nutrition on the wards was also inconsistent. In 36% 
of the cases  there was evidence of poor fluid management and in 34% nutritional needs 
had not been assessed or managed (HC, 2007, p. 38).  
 
The infection control team 
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and 
one made difficult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources 
available to them and their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for 
accountability were not clear (HC, 2007, p. 54) and it was not clear who was 
responsible for the team. Infection control nurses were accountable to the director of 
nursing, however, the pathology manager held the budget for these nurses, but did not 
consider that he had any management responsibly for infection control. Not until 
September 2006 did the trust take steps to clarify the management of the team (HC, 
2007, p. 51). 
 
Equipment and hygiene 
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a great 
deal to the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and patients had 
in some cases to share equipment (e.g., Zimmer frames) which were not cleaned before 
use (HC, 2007, p. 4). The infection control team were keen to isolate patients once they 
had been identified as C. diff. cases, however the scarcity of side rooms made this 
difficult. As a result many patients before and after the outbreaks were kept on open 
wards. The design of buildings and their age meant that many wards did not have 
sufficient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in utility rooms. The 
buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when they were 
first opened di not have adequate cleaning and laundry services (HC, 2007, p. 6). 
 
Analysing the outbreaks using the systems approach 
The outbreaks which occurred within the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust 
represent the combined impact of a complex set of factors extending over several years. 
In common with most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the 
outbreaks are best interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of 
interrelated systemic factors and influences (Turner, 1978; Reason, 2008). Figure 2 
attempts to use some of the elements of the systems ergonomic frameworks described 
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earlier in the paper (figure 1) in order to further analyse the outbreaks. In order to 
illustrate the framework as it applies to the outbreaks, a small sample of the 
contributory factors are used to link together some of the system components. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
Government, regulatory bodies and trust governance 
At the very highest level of the system it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the role played 
by government-set targets as a discrete factor leading to the outbreaks. Targets placed 
many individuals, particularly those at trust board and management levels under a great 
deal of pressure. This pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and 
in some cases to prioritise bed occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection 
outbreak.  Previous research on the influence that targets have on management 
decision-making in health care tends to be equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) for 
example, show that the impact of satisfying a specific target (e.g., hospital waiting 
times) has not been analysed in terms of how this influences other related services (e.g., 
quality of care). Others have suggested that health care targets represent: “tin openers 
rather than dials … they do not give answers but prompt further investigation and 
inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate answer” (Carter, 
Klein and Day, 1995). Within the trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable 
pressure on the system as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of the 
system. It is possible that the drive to comply with these targets increased the likelihood 
of an adverse event or set of events taking place at some stage within the trust. 
 
Poor communication, confusion of responsibilities and accountabilities between and 
within the various regulatory bodies delayed the time in which they could react to the 
outbreaks. A separate report by the Healthcare Commission (2008) examined the 
underlying causes of serious failures in NHS health care providers and identified large-
Page 7 of 30
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/JIPS
Journal of Infection Prevention
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
scale organisational processes such as mergers and poor change management 
procedures as common factors. Within the wider literature on large-scale accidents and 
disasters (e.g., Perrow, 1999, 2007) the nature of organisational linkages and structures 
are also widely acknowledged to be significant explanatory factors. 
 
Hospital management 
Within the hospital the actions of senior managers were identified as significantly 
contributing to the failure to prevent and deal with the outbreaks. The link between 
management, human resource management (HRM) practices and work performance 
outcomes has been investigated in detail in the last few years. Wood and Wall (2002) 
for example, reviewed the evidence that suggests there is a link between high-
involvement HRM practices and employee productivity. High involvement HRM 
practices typically include empowering employees to make their own decisions and the 
presence of self-managed teams. The review showed that there these types of practices 
in organisations do tend to increase levels of employee productivity. Similar effects 
have been shown between HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g., 
number of adverse events). In general, there is strong evidence to suggest that aspects of 
management behaviour partially shape and determine the culture of safety within 
organisations (e.g., Zohar, 2000). Within health care specifically, West et al. (2002) 
carried out a large-scale survey of the relationship between HRM practices and general 
in-hospital mortality. The survey showed some aspects of high involvement HRM were 
associated with lower mortality rates after adjustment for patient and hospital 
characteristics. 
 
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still 
remains as to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the 
outbreaks and their consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original 
Healthcare Commission report reported that they were aware of how serious the 
situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do anything about it. One 
possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in her study of the Challenger shuttle 
disaster termed the “normalization of deviance”, namely that managers over time began 
to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the Trust. Only after the 
level of risk built up to a point where it could not be controlled, did they begin to realise 
the gravity of the situation. 
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Clinical management and equipment and buildings 
Understaffing and general lack of resources together played a part in the outbreaks. 
Staffing ratios and levels of staff morale almost certainly contributed to the problem of 
containing the spread of infection on the wards. In general, the research literature 
provides some evidence that lower levels of staffing increase the likelihood of 
infections occurring. Hugonnet et al. (2004) (cited in Griffiths et al., 2008) examined 
the numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing relative to infection levels. The 
researchers found an inverse relationship between staff downsizing and the rate of 
hospital-based infection. Curiously, little research has been conducted on the impact of 
job satisfaction/morale on hospital infection levels, however, work in other domains 
(e.g., manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of satisfaction are 
clearly linked to lower levels of job performance (e.g., Parker, 2007). 
 
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other health care 
professionals within the trust shares similarities with those of senior managers and trust 
board managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor 
hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to improve the 
situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) analysed data from the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Report (Department of Health, 2001) and concluded that hospital staff became locked 
into particular lines of action or behaviour where they “search for confirmation that they 
are doing what they should be doing” (p. 73). These so-called “cultures of entrapment” 
inhibit an organisation’s ability to break out of patterns of behaviour that over time can 
lead to adverse outcomes. In the case of the trust they may provide some means with 
which to explain shared boundary spanning behaviours between levels within the 
hospital subsystem (figure 1). 
 
Ways forward and conclusions 
The analysis presented in the paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing  
hospital-based infection outbreaks from a system’s perspective. Many of the issues that 
have been discussed have not been researched in much depth within infection control, 
particularly organisational and managerial behaviour. The paper has only touched upon 
some of the behavioural issues involved with a system as complex as hospital-based 
Page 9 of 30
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/JIPS
Journal of Infection Prevention
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
healthcare. Much more research needs to be carried out, the aim being that the 
outcomes from this can be translated into practice. We are currently in danger of only 
seeing one part a much larger picture. Adopting a systems approach is one step towards 
filling in the missing details, particular as they relate to causal relationships that may 
exists between system levels such as the interaction between management styles, 
aspects of hospital design and individual behaviour (e.g., hand washing), and outcomes 
(e.g., infection rates). 
 
2878 words 
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Table 1: Summary timeline of infection outbreaks 
Time Period Event 
April 2000 Trust established following merger between two other 
local NHS Trusts 
2001/2-2005 High turnover of senior managers and period of 
organizational stability 
October 2005 - 
September 2006 
More than 500 patients developed the infection, 60 patients 
estimated to have died due to C. difficile infection. 
Before 2005 Trust has a high level of infection with C. difficile but no 
one in the trust or local health authority was aware of this 
Autumn 2005 Number of patients infected doubles. Approximately 150 
patients affected, a number of whom died as a result of the 
infection. (first outbreak) 
April – Sept. 2006 258 patients in total affected 
Beginning 2006 Number of newly infected patients declines. 
April 2006 Trust recognizes it has a major outbreak and reports this to 
strategic health authority and health protection unit. 
(second outbreak) 
April 2007 Healthcare Commission finds unacceptable examples of 
the use of contaminated equipment 
October 2007 Healthcare Commission Report published. 
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Infection Outbreaks in Acute Hospitals: A Systems Approach 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper puts forward the case for applying a systems approach to the analysis of 
hospital-based infection outbreaks. A major advantage of the systems approach is that 
it affords insights into how actions or occurrences at one system level (e.g., individual 
error) collectively interact with team (e.g., leadership style) and organisational (e.g., 
safety culture) levels of analysis. Most of the research concerned with behavioural 
aspects of infection control has focused on a single level of analysis (e.g., 
interventions to improve hand washing). The infection outbreaks at the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust are used as a case study in order to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the systems approach. The paper further outlines the human and 
organisational issues raised by the analysis and provides a means through which these 
aspects of infection can be highlighted as part of a future research agenda. within 
infection prevention using the systems approach (Deleted). 
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Introduction 
Within the last few years the subject of hospital infection control has become the 
subject of much media attention (e.g., Guardian Newspaper, 2007; BBC Panorama, 
2008). A number of high profile hospital outbreaks within the United Kingdom (UK) 
(New text) involving bacterium such as Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) and Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (New text) and the number of mortalities 
resulting from these outbreaks, has made infection control into a central priority for the 
NHS and other health care systems worldwide (Allegranzi et al., 2007). Much of the 
debate so far has concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g., hand 
washing). Very little research has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and 
organisational factors that may also determine infection control outbreaks (Griffiths, 
Renz and Rafferty, 2008). (Sentence broken into two). The intention of the present 
study is to outline the potential of adopting a systems ergonomic perspective towards 
hospital-based infections. 
 
The intention of the present study is to outline the potential of adopting a systems 
ergonomic perspective towards hospital-based infections. Systems ergonomics, 
examines large-scale issues such as the analysis and improvement of work 
environments that involve social and technical (“sociotechnical”) elements including 
organisational structures, policies and procedures. This type of work can be used to 
understand the complex interplay of factors that contribute to accidents and disasters 
(e.g., Railway and aviation accidents – Wilson et al., 2007; Reason, 2008), as well as 
provide recommendations aimed at minimising these factors. In order to demonstrate  
the value of such an approach the paper focuses on a specific case study, namely the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks which occurred between 2005-
2007 (Healthcare Commission, 2007). (Deleted) 
 
 
The systems approach and systems ergonomics (This section has been enlarged 
and re-written) 
Systems ergonomics, examines large-scale issues such as the analysis and improvement 
of work environments that involve social and technical (“sociotechnical”) elements 
including organisational structures, policies and procedures. Likewise, the systems 
approach involves a detailed examination of how these factors interact with one another 
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and how they are distributed across a range of system levels and interfaces (e.g., 
management, staff and individual levels).  A number of different types of accidents, 
disasters and large-scale system failures have been analysed in the past, spanning a 
range of domains including transportation (e.g., the Paddington rail accident – Santos-
Reyes and Beard, 2006; Wilson et al., 2007), nuclear power (e.g., the Chernobyl 
disaster – Reason, 1987, 2008) and patient safety (Vincent, 2006). (New text) Hospitals 
represent (Deletion and insertion) good examples of complex large-scale 
sociotechnical systems since they involve (New text) a large diversity of professions 
spanning a range of roles and specialisms as well as technologies and artefacts ranging 
from the latest eHealth applications (e.g., electronic patient record systems) to more 
established physical design components (e.g., wards and buildings). Within systems 
ergonomics, a number of modeling frameworks exist (e.g., Vicente, 2006; Rasmussen, 
1997) for understanding the dynamic interaction between levels within large-scale 
sociotechnical systems (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
 
Vicente and Christoffersen (2006) have used the modelling (Deleted) framework to 
identify the lessons learnt from the May 2000 outbreak of Escherichia coli  (E. coli) 
(New Text) which occurred in Walkerton, Canada. Their analysis used a graphical 
representation of the contributing factors that led up to the Walkerton outbreak. These 
ranged from decisions made at governmental levels (e.g., privatisation initiatives), the 
action of actors within the system (e.g., failures to take water samples), as well as 
equipment failures (e.g., shallow water wells). In order to demonstrate  the value of 
such an approach the paper focuses on a specific case study, namely the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks in the UK which occurred between 2005-2007 
(Healthcare Commission, 2007). (Deleted)  In order to demonstrate  the value of 
applying the systems approach and these types of modelling frameworks to infection 
control, the paper focuses on a specific case study, namely the Maidstone and 
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Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks in the UK which occurred between 2005-2007 
(Healthcare Commission (HC), 2007). (New text)  The next section outlines the main 
events and contributory factors leading up to the outbreaks. These are used to suggest 
ways in which the outbreaks could be analysed in more detail, and modelled using a 
systems ergonomic approach. (deleted) 
 
The Clostridium difficile outbreaks in the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS 
Trust 
 
Background to the outbreaks and timeline 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an estimated 90 people died 
at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as a result of becoming infected with 
the Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) bacteria (Healthcare Commission, (Deleted), HC 
(New text) 2007, p.5). Table 1 a timescale summarises the main events as they occurred 
at the Trust. 
 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
 
 
Contributory factors leading up to the outbreaks 
The Healthcare Commission (2007, HC, 2007) report identified a number of factors that 
contributed to the outbreaks that occurred with the Trust. These can be summarised in 
terms of five main themes: the role played by external organisations; management of 
the trust; clinical management on the hospital  wards; the role played by the infection 
control team; and,  equipment and hygiene factors. 
 
The role of external organisations 
Within the report both the setting of government-led targets and financial pressures on 
NHS Trusts are mentioned as background, contributory factors that had an impact on 
the day-to-day operation of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust. In particular, the 
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report mentions the need for Trust board members and managers to meet targets for the 
use of beds. Higher bed occupancy meant that there was less time for the cleaning and a 
higher probability of transmission of infection between patients (HC, 2007, pp.69-70).  
The need to meet financial targets such as spending on equipment and buildings 
(Deleted) also placed pressure on the Trust to cut back (Deleted) decrease spending 
(New text) in areas that impacted upon infection control such as financing for new 
buildings and isolation areas. 
 
Infection control within the UK NHS is overseen (New text and deletion) by a number 
of bodies including the Health Protection Agency (HPA). The remit of the HPA is to 
provide advice and support to NHS, local authorities and other agencies with regard to 
public health issues.  The creation of the HPA in April 2005 coincided with the first 
outbreak at the Trust. One part of the HPA, the health protection unit (HPU), was set up 
in order to support organisations in their management of infections. The report 
highlights that this caused some confusion within the Trust at the time of the outbreaks, 
as the expectation was that the HPU could give provide guidance covering the 
supervision and monitoring of infection control. The HPU did not have close 
involvement with the Trust and generally worked in a reactive way, responding to 
concerns as they arose (HC, 2007, p. 8).  Similar problems were encountered within the 
much larger Strategic Health Authority (SHA) who are responsible for implementing 
government policy and fiscal control within regions of the UK. 
 
Management of the Trust 
The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the 
management of the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In terms of clinical risks and 
incidents, management strategy in general “had been fragmentary and poorly 
understood” (HC, 2007, p. 77). The reports from an internal group set up within the 
Trust in order to analyse complaints, claims and incidents highlight, amongst others, the 
following issues: the unsatisfactory nature of some “escalation” areas (areas temporarily 
set up to deal with infected patients); the impact that the accident and emergency 
(A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality handover and transfer to wards 
from A&E; concerns about staffing levels, and, bank staff managing wards on some 
shifts. The style of leadership within the Trust and the overall management culture were 
also criticised in the report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive 
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as being “autocratic” or “dictatorial” (HC, 2007 p. 91). The report concluded that the 
person appointed as director of infection prevention and control had “no real 
understanding of the role at the outset” (HC, 2007, p. 5). Turnover of managers and 
directors was also high. 
 
Finally, the trust’s management of staffing was criticised heavily within the report in 
several places. The number of nurses working on wards had fallen since the period 
2002/03. and at the same time the number of beds had also reduced. (Deleted) In 
2006/07 the number of nurse per bed was 1.52, the same number as in 2003/04 (HC, 
2007, p. 82). Trust managers had not carried out a comprehensive review of staffing 
levels or a determination of minimum staffing levels. 
 
Clinical management on the hospital wards 
A review of the case notes of 50 patients who had died having had C. diff. found that in 
80% of the cases, at least one element of the clinical management, or monitoring of C. 
diff at ward level was unsatisfactory (HC, 2007, p. 4). A number of elements were 
mentioned, including: infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic 
monitoring as to whether or not a patient was recovering from C. diff.; and, failure to 
change antibiotic treatment when a patient failed to respond to the initial treatment (HC, 
2007, p. 4). Delays in starting treatment occurred on the wards, mostly because there 
was a delay in sending samples for analysis (HC, 1007, p. 33). There was also little 
evidence that once C. diff. had been diagnosed, that patients were monitored for severe 
signs of the infection (HC, 2007, p. 34). In other cases, it was clear that diagnoses were 
either not considered or had been missed. In 34% of the cases reviewed, medical 
records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diff had taken place (HC, 2007, p. 
38). The management of fluids and nutrition on the wards was also inconsistent. In 36% 
of the cases  there was evidence of poor fluid management and in 34% nutritional needs 
had not been assessed or managed (HC, 2007, p. 38).  
 
The infection control team 
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and 
one made difficult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources 
available to them and their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for 
accountability were not clear (HC, 2007, p. 54) and it was not clear who was 
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responsible for the team. Infection control nurses were accountable to the director of 
nursing, however, the pathology manager held the budget for these nurses, but did not 
consider that he had any management responsibly for infection control. Not until 
September 2006 did the trust take steps to clarify the management of the team (HC, 
2007, p. 51). 
 
Equipment and hygiene 
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a great 
deal to the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and patients had 
in some cases to share equipment (e.g., Zimmer frames) which were not cleaned before 
use (HC, 2007, p. 4). The infection control team were keen to isolate patients once they 
had been identified as C. diff. cases, however the scarcity of side rooms made this 
difficult. As a result many patients before and after the outbreaks were kept on open 
wards. The design of buildings and their age meant that many wards did not have 
sufficient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in utility rooms. The 
buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when they were 
first opened di not have adequate cleaning and laundry services (HC, 2007, p. 6). 
 
Analysing the outbreaks using the systems approach 
The outbreaks which occurred within the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust 
represent the combined impact of a complex set of factors extending over several years. 
In common with most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the 
outbreaks are best interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of 
interrelated systemic factors and influences (Turner, 1978; Reason, 2008). Figure 2 
attempts to use some of the elements of the systems ergonomic frameworks described 
earlier in the paper (figure 1) in order to further analyse the outbreaks. In order to 
illustrate the framework as it applies to the outbreaks, a small sample of the 
contributory factors are used to link together some of the system components. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
Government, regulatory bodies and trust governance 
At the very highest level of the system it is difficult to pinpoint exactly the role played 
by government-set targets as a discrete factor leading to the outbreaks. Targets placed 
many individuals, particularly those at trust board and management levels under a great 
deal of pressure. This pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and 
in some cases to prioritise bed occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection 
outbreak.  Previous research on the influence that targets have on management 
decision-making in health care tends to be equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) for 
example, show that the impact of satisfying a specific target (e.g., hospital waiting 
times) has not been analysed in terms of how this influences other related services (e.g., 
quality of care). Others have suggested that health care targets represent: “tin openers 
rather than dials … they do not give answers but prompt further investigation and 
inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate answer” (Carter, 
Klein and Day, 1995). Within the trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable 
pressure on the system as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of the 
system. It is possible that the drive to comply with these targets increased the likelihood 
of an adverse event or set of events taking place at some stage within the trust. 
 
Poor communication, confusion of responsibilities and accountabilities between and 
within the various regulatory bodies delayed the time in which they could react to the 
outbreaks. A separate report by the Healthcare Commission (2008) examined the 
underlying causes of serious failures in NHS health care providers and identified large-
scale organisational processes such as mergers and poor change management 
procedures as common factors. Within the wider literature on large-scale accidents and 
disasters (e.g., Perrow, 1999, 2007 (New reference) the nature of organisational 
linkages and structures are also widely acknowledged to be significant explanatory 
factors. 
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Hospital management 
Within the hospital the actions of senior managers were identified as significantly 
contributing to the failure to prevent and deal with the outbreaks. The link between 
management, human resource management (HRM) practices and work performance 
outcomes has been investigated in detail in the last few years. Wood and Wall (2002) 
for example, reviewed the evidence that suggests there is a link between high-
involvement HRM practices and employee productivity. High involvement HRM 
practices typically include empowering employees to make their own decisions and the 
presence of self-managed teams. The review showed that there these types of practices 
in organisations do tend to increase levels of employee productivity. Similar effects 
have been shown between HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g., 
number of adverse events). In general, there is strong evidence to suggest that aspects of 
management behaviour partially shape and determine the culture of safety within 
organisations (e.g., Zohar, 2000). Within health care specifically, West et al. (2002) 
carried out a large-scale survey of the relationship between HRM practices and general 
in-hospital mortality. The survey showed some aspects of high involvement HRM were 
associated with lower mortality rates after adjustment for patient and hospital 
characteristics. 
 
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still 
remains as to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the 
outbreaks and their consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original 
Healthcare Commission report reported that they were aware of how serious the 
situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do anything about it. One 
possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in her study of the Challenger shuttle 
disaster termed the “normalization of deviance”, namely that managers over time began 
to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the Trust. Only after the 
level of risk built up to a point where it could not be controlled, did they begin to realise 
the gravity of the situation. 
 
 
Clinical management and equipment and buildings 
Understaffing and general lack of resources together played a part in the outbreaks. 
Staffing ratios and levels of staff morale almost certainly contributed to the problem of 
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containing the spread of infection on the wards. In general, the research literature 
provides some evidence that lower levels of staffing increase the likelihood of 
infections occurring. Hugonnet et al. (2004) (cited in Griffiths et al., 2008) examined 
the numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing relative to infection levels. The 
researchers found an inverse relationship between staff downsizing and the rate of 
hospital-based infection. Curiously, little research has been conducted on the impact of 
job satisfaction/morale on hospital infection levels, however, work in other domains 
(e.g., manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of satisfaction are 
clearly linked to lower levels of job performance (e.g., Parker, 2007). 
 
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other health care 
professionals within the trust shares similarities with those of senior managers and trust 
board managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor 
hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to improve the 
situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) analysed data from the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Report (Department of Health, 2001) and concluded that hospital staff became locked 
into particular lines of action or behaviour where they “search for confirmation that they 
are doing what they should be doing” (p. 73). These so-called “cultures of entrapment” 
inhibit an organisation’s ability to break out of patterns of behaviour that over time can 
lead to adverse outcomes. In the case of the trust they may provide some means with 
which to explain shared boundary spanning behaviours between levels within the 
hospital subsystem (figure 1). 
 
Ways forward and conclusions 
The analysis presented in the paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing  
hospital-based infection outbreaks from a system’s perspective. Many of the issues that 
have been discussed have not been researched in much depth within infection control, 
particularly organisational and managerial behaviour. The paper has only touched upon 
some of the behavioural issues involved with a system as complex as hospital-based 
healthcare. Much more research needs to be carried out, the aim being that the 
outcomes from this can be translated into practice. We are currently in danger of only 
seeing one part a much larger picture. Adopting a systems approach is one step towards 
filling in the missing details, particular as they relate to causal relationships that may 
exists between system levels such as the interaction between management styles, 
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aspects of hospital design and individual behaviour (e.g., hand washing), and outcomes 
(e.g., infection rates). 
 
 
New word count 2878 words 
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